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# OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES FOR DEVELOPMENT

# JOINT INSPECTION UNIT

## National execution of projects

## Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the General Assembly the report of the Joint Inspection Unit entitled "National execution of projects" (JIU/REP/94/9).

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ANNEX

JIU/REP/94/9

[ORIGINAL: ARABIC, CHINESE, ENGLISH, FRENCH, RUSSIAN AND SPANISH]

# NATIONAL EXECUTION OF PROJECTS

*Prepared by*
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**Joint Inspection Unit**

**Geneva**
**1994**

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## Acronyms and abbreviations

### ORGANIZATIONS

| | |
|---|---|
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations |
| IAEA | International Atomic Energy Agency |
| IBRD | International Bank for Reconstruction and Development |
| IFAD | International Fund for Agricultural Development |
| ILO | International Labour Organisation |
| IMO | International Maritime Organization |
| ITU | International Telecommunication Union |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNESCO | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization |
| UNFPA | United Nations Population Fund |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| UNIDO | United Nations Industrial Development Organization |
| UPU | Universal Postal Union |
| WFP | World Food Programme |
| WHO | World Health Organization |

### INSTITUTIONS

| | |
|---|---|
| ACC | Administrative Committee on Co-ordination |
| AOS | Administrative and Operational Services |
| CCPOQ | Consultative Committee on Programme and Operational Questions |
| GCCC | Government Cash Counterpart Contribution |
| IPF | Indicative Planning Figure |
| NEX | National execution of projects |
| NGO | Non-governmental organization |
| NPD | National Project Director |
| OPS | Office for Project Services |
| TCDC | Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries |
| TPC | Technical Project Chief |
| TSS | Technical Support Services |

## Bibliographic references


| | |
|---|---|
| General Assembly | Resolution 47/199<br>Resolution 44/211<br>Resolution 32/197 |
| UNDP Governing Council | Decision 92/22<br>Decision 90/34<br>Decision 90/26<br>Decision 90/21 |
| UNDP | Guidelines for Programme Support Document (PSD), November 1983 |
| UNDP | Programme and Projects Manual (PPM), Revision 0, May 1991 |
| UNDP Guidelines | Determination of Execution and Implementation Arrangements;<br><br>Successor Arrangements for Agency Support Costs, Revision 1, October 1992 |
| JIU/REP/78/3 | Report on the Role of Experts in Development Cooperation, Geneva, 1978 |
| No author | UNDP Study on Government Execution, Report of mission to Asia, November 1981<br><br>Guidelines for National Execution of UNDP-Assisted Projects in India (IET 8580), New Delhi, March 1992<br><br>Evaluation Bulletin, Bulletin No. 4, autumn 1993<br><br>Inter-Agency Informal Consultations on Programme-Approach and National Execution, Turin, ITC, ILO, 24-28 April 1994 |

## SUMMARY, FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

### 1. Summary

Although the principle of national execution of projects is largely accepted in theory, a certain amount of resistance is still encountered when putting it into practice. This resistance includes:

(a) That of donors, who, in view of the recipient countries' lack of experience and the inadequacy of their management capacity, are wary of injudicious use of the funds allocated to national programmes and projects;

(b) Reluctance also on the part of the specialized agencies, which consider that countries do not have the necessary capacity to execute the projects concerned;

(c) Lack of confidence on the part of the countries concerned in their national experts; and lastly

(d) Lack of interest on the part of international experts, in view of the unattractive conditions offered by countries.

Levels of national execution of projects vary according to the country, Government and region concerned. In this respect several factors bear consideration:

(a) The capacity of the Government, and the competence and authority of senior officials in ministries and national institutions;

(b) The attitude of UNDP: the instructions from headquarters to Resident Representatives in each country;

(c) The competence and personality of the Resident Representative;

(d) The participation of the specialized agencies as and when they become involved in the country's framework-programme;

(e) The nature of the project (study or technical);

(f) The quality and degree of cooperation between the partners: Governments and other national institutions, UNDP, specialized agencies and NGOs;

(g) The degree of transparency and effectiveness in the choice of executing agent and implementation of the project.

Certain dysfunctions have been noted in some places, showing that, in the context of the national execution of programmes and projects, all the partners do not yet have the same understanding:

(a) Of the definition - precise and acceptable to all - of the concept of national execution of programmes and projects;

(b) Of their roles and their relations with the other players, in particular at the programming, implementation and management levels.

Since this dysfunctioning is in the long term liable to disrupt the attainment of the objectives of national execution of projects, it cannot be too strongly recommended that stress should be laid both on clarification and simplification of the new rules concerning project execution, and on the training of decision makers and senior personnel in the developing countries at the three levels mentioned above.

2. Principal findings

The flow of information between the headquarters of system organizations (UNDP, specialized agencies) and recipient countries leaves something to be desired. Communication by telephone is often extremely difficult between these two categories of partners, and getting mail to the countries concerned is slow, and sometimes impossible. Given this situation, use of new information technologies accessible to the countries concerned, such as CD-ROM and video, may be recommended. UNESCO is helping to strengthen intersectoral programmes, notably through the libraries at information centres, secondary schools, colleges and universities. It could, in conjunction with other organizations, contribute at least partially to the solution of these communication difficulties.

This sluggishness in the flow of information may in some cases be attributed to cumbersome government bureaucracy. There is, in fact, a very long lapse of time between requests, notably for administrative authorizations by the agencies, 1/ and the Government's reply, and there are considerable delays by Governments in the delivery of their cash counterpart contributions.

Some Governments sometimes put strong pressure both on national staff assigned to projects and on technical staff (international experts), and do not always respect specialized agencies' technical opinions. This has in many cases led, inter alia, to a reduction in international consultants' working time in the country concerned.

The programme approach encourages national execution of projects and promotes cooperation between partners at the country level. But the participation of the governmental authorities is dependent on the existence in the country of a macro-economic context, in other words, a multidisciplinary and multisectoral technical team responsible for advising the Government on the preparation of the programme within which projects financed by UNDP or other sources are to be incorporated. In fact, in many developing countries such bodies do not exist.

It is also apparent in some recipient countries that activities started and commitments entered into are systematically neglected with the departure of the officials who were their institutional instigators. This lack of respect by the State for its contractual commitments and the absence of continuity in its action are undeniable factors in poor NEX results. National staff assigned to projects by States are not always available because, for example, of their sudden transfer to other departments by the authorities of the country concerned.

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Through lack of regular consultation between the financing organizations and the specialized agencies, and lack of a clear and comprehensive view of the priorities of some recipient countries, UNDP, the agencies and donors do not always succeed in coordinating their participation in the programme of those countries or in avoiding mutual competition which is liable to jeopardize the coherence and effective execution of the project.

The total volume of projects executed by countries is growing steadily. However, since this growth is less apparent in some regions and countries than in others, the UNDP Representatives (primarily) in the former category of regions and countries should be invited to make greater efforts to explain the new approach in order to facilitate understanding by governmental authorities and persuade them to commit themselves in a more systematic, more relevant and more effective manner to the policy of national execution.

Some Governments exercise their full authority in the execution of their programme and the choice of implementing agents, while others take little interest in UNDP funds and instruct UNDP or other institutions in the United Nations system, in particular OPS, to handle the implementation of projects and the management of resources.

On the other hand, the countries interested in financial assistance from UNDP appreciate the new "national execution" method. They need the assistance of the specialized agencies in order to acquire the necessary technical and administrative competence for the execution of all their projects. 2/

The specialized agencies have extensive technical capacity accumulated over the years. They are capable of selecting and identifying experts and consultants in the country concerned and abroad. But in many cases, the following points have been noted:

(a) A lack of collaboration between the Resident Representative and the representatives of certain agencies: either the latter are not invited to discussions on the formulation of the country's framework-programme, or a particular agency is not invited by the Government or, in some cases, by the Resident Representative until after the project had been selected and evaluated in its absence;

(b) The specialized agencies have great facilities for access to information and to the international market on more advantageous terms than the Governments receiving assistance. In the recruitment of experts, for example, because of the security they afford, experts too prefer to be recruited by UNDP or a specialized agency rather than by Governments;

(c) While highlighting the importance of the efforts made in training nationals of the countries concerned, a careful examination of the programmes of United Nations institutions (UNDP, DDSMS, etc.) and the specialized agencies in this area reveals a certain imbalance. Most of these programmes are in fact geared to project management and intended for managers, and only rarely for the decision makers and senior staff called upon to identify priority sectors and to formulate and evaluate national projects.

Each institution, agency and department having its own budget and programme wants to organize its own training courses and its own workshops, a situation which reflects a lack of coordination between them. In the case of seminars on topics relating to specific technologies, such as telecommunication techniques and shipping, the organization of separate seminars is justified. But for all matters relating to management activities, i.e. the formulation of programmes, project evaluation, project funds management, international procurement and the recruitment of experts, it is important to centralize the resources intended for the financing of training activities and to use the services of the ILO International Training Centre in Turin.

3. Conclusion

The concept of national execution denotes both a method of execution of projects financed in the context of the United Nations and a development objective, an objective which is undoubtedly of the greatest importance for the whole of multilateral technical cooperation policy.

Although UNDP has to a certain extent rushed in the universal application of national execution of projects without really taking account of the technical and management capacities of the countries concerned, it would seem that national execution is gradually being accepted and supported by Governments and the specialized agencies. As a development objective, however, it still calls for much effort on the part of countries and, above all, the United Nations.

Since the fundamental objective of national execution is the building and strengthening of national capacities in the area of programming, evaluation, formulation and execution, its attainment depends largely and above all on the seriousness and effectiveness with which the system organizations play their principal role, which is to transfer to Governments the technology necessary for their self-development. In this area, the most urgent priority activities of these organizations continue to be the financing of special training in programming for senior staff and decision makers in the countries receiving assistance, and efforts to undertake modular training programmes on project management.

However, countries' responsibility for the attainment of the first objective of national execution is just as important as the action of the organizations in the United Nations system, since it is not sufficient for training programmes to be financed: the individuals trained must be effectively and rationally employed by their Governments in the execution of national projects, which unfortunately is still far from being the case. However, only if this condition is fulfilled will NEX cease to be viewed by donors as a bottomless pit - an operation without purpose or tangible results, and will NEX enable Governments to acquire an endogenous development capacity and to make substantial savings in project budgets through the use of national expertise.

Generally speaking, the training and effective use of nationals for project execution benefits both recipient countries and counterpart organizations. The countries acquire mastery of programming, formulation, execution and administrative management of projects, and of accounting and

/...

reporting. 3/ Moreover, this helps to reduce the numbers of missions to the countries concerned, experts and technical personnel of organizations formerly financed from project budgets. As to the organizations (UNDP, specialized agencies and donors), the savings achieved through the use of national expertise may enable them to finance other development programme-related activities in the various countries.

Notwithstanding the growing number of programmes and projects executed by countries, it is no exaggeration to say that in some respects national execution of projects has not so far produced the expected results. Whereas the new arrangements were intended, inter alia, to raise the level of technical support of the specialized agencies, misappreciation - by countries and by the agencies themselves - of the rules and procedures for the use of UNDP financial resources has in practice led to under-utilization of this technical support.

Thus, for example, an examination of UNDP expenditure during its fifth programming cycle shows that up to the end of 1993 resources effectively allocated to technical support services (TSS-1 and TSS-2) represented only US$ 13,831,000 out of a total of US$ 1,016,612,000, or 1.4 per cent of total UNDP expenditure during the period in question. It is true that this cycle is only in its second year, but this percentage is still a long way short of what, on average, it should have been if the proportion of resources allocated to technical support services is eventually to amount to at least 13 per cent of the old system. This fact alone proves, if such proof were necessary, that the new arrangements still need further detailed explanation to countries and specialized agencies.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1

In order to strengthen the partnership between Governments, UNDP and the specialized agencies at headquarters and country levels, it is important that:

(a) The Resident Representative should refer to the decisions and options contained in the framework-programme and seek the Government's agreement when formulating the national strategy note;

(b) When formulating the country framework-programme, member States that so desire should receive the technical opinions and advice of the specialized agencies, each of which has enormous experience in its sphere of competence;

(c) All the specialized agencies should participate in the formulation of the country framework-programme;

(d) The selection of agents responsible for implementing a project or a project element should be made transparently and in a spirit of genuine cooperation, after consultations between all the partners, in accordance with paragraph 32 of General Assembly resolution 42/196.

Recommendation 2

In order to help Governments to acquire the necessary capacity for identifying the country's real needs, selecting priority sectors, formulating framework-programmes, and coordinating external assistance together with the activities and inputs of the partners (UNDP, specialized agencies, donors), it is recommended that a special fund should be set up within UNDP to:

(a) Finance the training programmes organized by Governments or specialized agencies;

(b) Organize, for the benefit of senior staff and decision makers in member States, training seminars in the various countries, subregions and regions or at the International Training Centre in Turin (Italy); 4/

(c) Encourage the establishment of inter-agency teams responsible for counselling Governments on any question relating to the national execution of projects and coordinating the activities of all the United Nations system organizations in the various countries; 5/

(d) Promote, at the country level, the establishment of multidisciplinary and multisectoral teams comprising representatives of the various ministries, the private sector, NGOs and the scientific community. But it is important that the Government should set clear limits on their activities and ensure that they do not become parallel or competing bodies with the traditional governmental institutions.

Recommendation 3

The specialized agencies in the United Nations system should continue efforts to decentralize their technical services at the country or subregional levels and assign to these countries or subregions highly qualified personnel to train nationals, and transfer scientific and technical know-how.

Recommendation 4

The great number of rules and procedures relating to project management in force in UNDP and the specialized agencies constitute a big stumbling-block for Governments and system organizations alike. UNDP should therefore revise some of the procedures in its "Programme and Projects Manual" (PPM) so as to make them less complicated and thus facilitate the application of the new NEX method, particularly as regards successor arrangements. 6/ It should also encourage dissemination of the measures contained in the May 1992 report of the Inter-Agency Procurement Services Office (IAPSO) 7/ in the recipient countries.

In addition, UNDP, jointly with the specialized agencies, should:

(a) Formulate a definition - clear and acceptable to all - of national execution projects, in order to avoid varying interpretation according to the partners responsible for applying it;

(b) Establish clear regulations relating to the management of project funds and to the method of compensation and reimbursement of expenditure in favour of the specialized agencies (TSS-1 and TSS-2);

(c) Formulate, at the local level in consultation with the Government, clear systems:

(i) For the use of local resources and external inputs;

(ii) Relating to the determination of salaries and allowances to be paid to local personnel (national project directors and other specialized government personnel assigned to NEX projects and personnel recruited by the specialized agencies in their areas of competence), so as to avoid excessive discrepancies in salaries between the staff assigned to NEX projects.

## INTRODUCTION

### The context

1. The concept of national execution of projects by Governments (NEX) was introduced in the 1980s and has since made headway, giving rise to a practical policy. Statistics show that numbers of nationally executed projects and the volumes of funding devoted to them are increasing markedly (see tables 1-4, annex II).

2. The evolution of this new method of project execution since its inauguration in the 1980s reveals two significant developments: the undeniable growth in the number of government-executed projects, and the variations in NEX practices and results according to the region and/or country concerned.

3. Given the importance of this new method introduced by the General Assembly, the Director-General of FAO, in a letter dated 3 November 1989, suggested that the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) should carry out a study on "Government execution of UNDP-funded technical cooperation projects".

4. The General Assembly, in paragraph 13 of resolution 44/211 of 22 December 1989 relating to the "Comprehensive triennial policy review of operational activities for development of the United Nations system", again strongly recommended this method of project execution.

5. The UNDP Governing Council also took a number of decisions on the subject, notably decisions 90/21, 90/26 and 90/34, specifying action to be taken in order to give effect to the General Assembly's resolutions. In addition, the General Assembly, in paragraph 15 of resolution 47/199 of 22 December 1992, said that project execution by Governments should be the norm for programmes and projects supported by the United Nations system.

6. Although the proportion of government-executed projects is still relatively low (15 per cent on average) taking all regions together (see fig. 1, p. 14), it has nevertheless been increasing sharply in all regions, especially since 1991 (see table 1 and fig. 3, p. 16). Between 1988 and 1993, the government project/total project ratio grew almost threefold in Africa, more than fourfold in the countries of Asia and the Pacific, almost sixfold in the Arab countries, more than fivefold in the central and east European countries, and more than threefold in Latin America (see table 2 and fig. 4, p. 17; table 3 and fig. 5, p. 18).

7. At the same time, however, it is apparent that the situation varies considerably from one region to another. Thus, for example, government-executed projects account for 38 per cent of total projects in Latin America, 17 per cent in the Arab countries, 16 per cent in the countries of Asia and the Pacific, and 12 per cent in Europe. The proportion in Africa (11 per cent) remains the smallest (see fig. 2, p. 15).

8. It is apparent from these two findings that Governments and their partners are increasingly supportive of the NEX principle but do not yet share the same understanding of it. More specifically, the various players do not seem to have the same conception of their responsibilities and roles.

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Figure 1

TOTAL PROJECTS FINANCED BY UNDP BETWEEN 1988 AND 1993

Distributed according to their method of execution
as a percentage of total projects




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Figure 2

PROJECTS EXECUTED BY GOVERNMENTS BETWEEN 1988 AND 1993

As a percentage of total projects financed by UNDP during the same period and in the same regions




Calculated on the basis of the data in the Annual Budget Summary of the Programme Information Profile - Function 2 indicated in annex II to the present study.

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Table 1

PROJECTS FINANCED BY UNDP AND EXECUTED BY GOVERNMENTS

By year and by region between 1988 and 1993 (1988 = base 100)

| | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AFRICA | 91 | 119 | 138 | 172 | 289 |
| ASIA AND PACIFIC | 126 | 119 | 128 | 184 | 473 |
| ARAB STATES | 149 | 196 | 347 | 601 | 743 |
| EUROPE | 110 | 151 | 442 | 223 | 427 |
| LATIN AMERICA | 93 | 110 | 122 | 168 | 152 |

Calculated on the basis of the data in the Annual Budget Summary of the Programme Information Profile - Function 2 indicated in annex II to the present study

Figure 3

PROJECTS FINANCED BY UNDP AND EXECUTED BY GOVERNMENTS

By year and by region between 1988 and 1993 (1988 = base 100)




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Table 2

PROJECTS FINANCED BY UNDP BY YEAR AND BY REGION

By year and by region between 1988 and 1993 (1988 = base 100)

| | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AFRICA | 110 | 125 | 132 | 106 | 108 |
| ASIA AND PACIFIC | 104 | 124 | 124 | 105 | 136 |
| ARAB STATES | 129 | 148 | 113 | 116 | 121 |
| EUROPE | 112 | 95 | 118 | 67 | 77 |
| LATIN AMERICA | 122 | 181 | 175 | 149 | 165 |

Calculated on the basis of the data in the Annual Budget Summary of the Programme Information Profile - Function 2 indicated in annex II to the present study.

Figure 4

PROJECTS FINANCED BY UNDP BY YEAR AND BY REGION

By year and by region between 1988 and 1993 (1988 = base 100)




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Table 3

RATIO GOVERNMENT PROJECTS/TOTAL PROJECTS BY YEAR AND BY REGION

Between 1988 and 1993

| | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AFRICA | 8 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 13 | 23 |
| ASIA AND PACIFIC | 8 | 12 | 9 | 10 | 17 | 34 |
| ARAB STATES | 6 | 6 | 8 | 17 | 30 | 35 |
| EUROPE | 5 | 5 | 7 | 17 | 16 | 26 |
| LATIN AMERICA | 27 | 27 | 32 | 35 | 52 | 61 |

Calculated on the basis of the data in the Annual Budget Summary of the Programme Information Profile - Function 2 indicated in annex II to the present study.

Figure 5

RATIO GOVERNMENT PROJECTS/TOTAL PROJECTS BY YEAR AND BY REGION

Between 1988 and 1993




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9. In order to dispel the regrettable misunderstandings resulting from this situation, misunderstandings which undoubtedly jeopardize the harmonious functioning of the partnership - the foundation for the success of NEX - and the results expected from application of this method, the following two crucial questions should be cleared up once and for all:

(a) The responsibilities of Governments: their authority as executing agents for their programmes and projects, and their powers with regard to the selection of executing and implementing agents for projects;

(b) The role of each partner involved in the process of national project execution.

10. This is essentially the exercise attempted in the present study. At the same time, the study will take up the related but crucial problems of the training and building of national capacities which occupy a central position in the very concept of national execution. Obviously, this question, which extends beyond the scope of this study, will be dealt with only in passing, but it does appear to deserve a study in its own right.

The method

11. This study is essentially based on the analysis of replies to the questionnaire which was sent to the specialized agencies in the United Nations system and to a number of member States and UNDP. It has also made use of the findings of visits to a number of countries and to different departments within the United Nations secretariat and the specialized agencies, and talks with a number of coordinating Resident Representatives, and government and administration officials.

12. The study has been carried out in a number of stages, the first of which began in 1990-1991. After the initial research, which showed that national execution of projects was for many still an abstract innovation, the study had to be held up until the various players in the national execution of projects gained a clearer understanding of the NEX concept. The UNDP bureaux were in fact engaged in organizing explanatory seminars in a number of countries. Any evaluation of this new method of project execution would therefore have been premature.

13. Pursuant to a decision by the Governing Council of UNDP 8/ calling for an external independent evaluation of the new method, the Joint Inspection Unit decided to resume the study, as part of its work programme for 1994, and to prepare the present report.

14. For this reason, between December 1993 and March 1994 a number of units within the United Nations Secretariat (DDSMS, UNDP, OPS, TCDC, DGIP, UNICEF, UNFPA) and the specialized agencies 9/ were visited in order to learn about their experience with the national execution of projects. Lastly, it should be emphasized that the results of this activity were supplemented by an analysis of the NEX evaluation reports, particularly with regard to the Asian countries, and also of the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, submitted to this year's session of ECOSOC, relating to United Nations operational activities in the area of international development cooperation.

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## I. THEORY UNDERLYING THE NATIONAL EXECUTION OF PROJECTS (NEX)

### A. The concept

15. The concept of the national execution of projects comprises a set of arrangements by which the entire responsibility for execution of their programmes and projects is transferred to developing countries. It is based on a combination of: 10/

(a) A number of new principles relating to the treatment of development programmes and projects, concerning property, execution and implementation;

(b) Readjustment of the respective roles of countries, UNDP and the specialized agencies, and of the relations between them in the context of a three-way partnership; and

(c) New mechanisms for financing specialized agency technical support for countries.

16. In accordance with the new UNDP "Guidelines", 11/ all programmes/projects are the property of countries, which direct and oversee them. On this basis, countries are responsible for the establishment of priorities, the attainment of the development objectives of programmes and projects, and the long-term viability of results. For the use of the funds advanced Governments are responsible to the Administrator of UNDP, who is himself responsible to the UNDP Governing Council, United Nations funds, donors and the other financing organizations. 12/

17. In the new programme and projects policy, the terms "execution" and "implementation" each have a specific meaning and can no longer be used as alternatives as in the past. "Execution" relates to the overall management of the programme/project and to the obligation to give an account of results, the attainment of programme/project objectives and the use of resources. "Implementation", on the other hand, is chiefly concerned with technical and administrative tasks, procuring and purchasing supplies, delivering components (equipment, facilities) needed for projects, recruiting experts, and managing projects financially and administratively.

18. The new method of financing draws a distinction between technical support services (TSS) and administrative and operational services (AOS), and creates two sets of TSS machinery: TSS-1, provided at the programme level, and TSS-2, provided at the project level. These two latter mechanisms apply only to five large agencies, 13/ while the essential components of the old system still apply to all the others. 14/

### B. The approaches

19. The concept of national execution has not always been applied in all places with the same rigour. Slight variations, with considerable consequences, are apparent here and there, and reflect, in both countries and agencies, differences in approach to implementation of the concept. Thus, for example, it happens in some countries that a single ministry is designated as executing agent for a programme or project, whereas in others this function is entrusted to a number of national institutions possessing the specific

competence necessary for execution of the projects or certain project elements. In other cases, ad hoc national units are set up as focal points to perform the tasks relating to national execution or to advise the Government in that undertaking. 15/ And in some cases NGOs and private-sector institutions perform the role of executing agents. 16/

20. Sometimes specialized agencies such as FAO, WHO and UNIDO combine the functions of financing source and implementing agency, particularly in the case of projects not financed by UNDP. In these cases, they often entrust implementation tasks to national entities. For its part, UNFPA functions in some countries as a central purchasing organization for the projects it supports, leaving the central executing-agent tasks to the Government.

21. Implementation is sometimes entrusted to national agencies, such as autonomous institutions or organizations working in the field and possessing appropriate technical and administrative capacities. But in some cases the Government designates one or more specialized agencies in the United Nations system as implementing agents, in recognition of the specific nature of their work, their competence and the expertise they have available to them.

22. With regard to financial procedures for national execution, there are still significant differences in the practice of countries, specialized agencies and UNDP. Thus, for example, whereas UNDP makes quarterly advance payments, requiring an account of expenditure at the end of each quarter, UNICEF generally reimburses expenditure already effected.

23. This outline of differences in approach to implementation of the concept and policy of national execution of programmes and projects is not exhaustive, but it does give an indication of the imprecision in the concept and policy of NEX, which has been responsible for a certain amount of dysfunction that has jeopardized the attainment of its immediate and long-term objectives. The lines which follow endeavour to demonstrate this point.

### C. Attempted synthesis

24. In order to take account of these disparities, paragraph 22 of resolution 47/199 requested the Secretary-General to promote agreement on a common interpretation of NEX. To this request the Consultative Committee on Programme and Operational Questions (CCPOQ) responded by emphasizing that Governments are primarily responsible and accountable for the administration of their development programmes and projects, and that NEX must be the norm for programmes and projects financed by the United Nations system.

25. The common framework formulated by CCPOQ pays particular attention to the technical role to be played in NEX by the institutions in the United Nations system and encourages their involvement at the time of formulation and technical evaluation of country programmes, in other words, at the very outset of programming, in order to give senior national officials their technical opinions and advice. But this common interpretation sometimes causes practical problems of application, notably because of differences in the situation of countries and of specialized agencies in the United Nations system.

26. In fact, this interpretation rigidly systemizes the division of labour which, in its pure form, the concept of NEX establishes between the three categories of partners, namely, countries, specialized agencies and UNDP. However, if countries have to possess sufficient technical, administrative and managerial capacity to be able effectively to accept responsibility for execution of their programmes and projects, it goes without saying that NEX will not be applicable in countries lacking such capacity, unless they have the possibility of delegating that responsibility to organizations in the system. Furthermore, if the agencies are also to be involved in the whole NEX process, both upstream and downstream, it is imperative that their respective activities and fields of competence should be known in the countries or that they themselves should all be represented in the field. This is far from being the case, particularly with regard to the smaller agencies.

27. All in all, in so far as the concept of national execution of programmes and projects is intended to organize a three-way division of labour between the partners involved, it is clear that the roles of these partners and the relations between them constitute the keystone of national execution. It is vigorous observance of these two elements which lies at the basis of the correspondence of the concept with the policy (practice) of national execution and the effective attainment of its fundamental objective. It is also primarily at this level that a number of measures should be adopted to lessen, if not eliminate, the dysfunction which is currently casting a shadow on NEX performance.

## II. NEX IN PRACTICE: THE ROLE OF THE PARTNERS AND THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM

### A. Roles

28. The concept of national execution confers on each partner in the triad a specific mandate whose practical application imposes a number of conditions which define the role each plays in NEX.

#### Governments

29. The programmes/projects are all the property of the countries concerned, which direct them and oversee them. In this capacity they bear overall responsibility for managing the funds advanced by UNDP, drawing up their priorities, achieving the development objectives of their programmes and projects and ensuring the long-term viability of the results. In order to discharge this responsibility Governments must assess their own capacities in order to decide whether they can execute their programmes themselves or whether they should draw on outside expertise. 17/

30. These tasks call for high-level skills based on multidisciplinary knowledge that Governments must locate within themselves if they are to be in a position to fulfil their role efficiently and unaided. If they possess these skills they can legitimately - and should - execute all project phases themselves, from programming to final execution. If not, they must call upon an outside executing agent, thus bringing partnership into play. In addition, they must honour their commitment to UNDP by providing their financial and material counterpart contribution as a part of "GCCC" in good time so as to

prevent delays in project execution. They must also assign competent staff with enough education to quickly assimilate the rules of project management and administration.

31. Some countries have central, multidisciplinary technical units bringing together representatives of all public and private scientific and technical centres. The mandates of such units are to coordinate and analyse all national programmes and advise the Government on the decisions it should take. In such countries, the Governments know what they want and implementation measures are clear and are followed by all partners: UNDP, the agencies and other national or international institutions.

32. Given these conditions, would we not be justified in asking whether this does not mean in substance that if the countries concerned do not possess the required skills or the counterpart financial and material resources, they must shift the execution of their programmes to external agencies? As the prime objective of NEX is to help developing countries to progress, thanks to their own efforts, how can they move forward independently and control their own development process if they must constantly rely on agencies other than their own for the execution of their programmes/projects? Here, clearly, lies the risk of a vicious circle of underdevelopment.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

33. UNDP is the principal supplier of resources to developing countries and has the funds (IPFs, donors, and UNFPA and UNICEF programme funds) to finance programmes at Governments' requests. Within the context of national execution of programmes and projects, UNDP has a mandate to:

(a) Help Governments to secure the necessary capacity for project execution and management in an NEX setting; 18/

(b) Provide Governments with the various documents and other instructions needed (e.g. Guidelines on national execution of projects, documents on successor arrangements, etc.);

(c) Organize, in cooperation with other specialized agencies, seminars for political decision makers and national officials at the levels of project programming and formulation, project resources management, account-keeping and project administration. This is very important inasmuch as it enables all States to become truly involved in applying this new project execution technique, calling on other international institutions (specialized agencies and private sector institutions) only in sectors where they have as yet no capacity.

34. It also falls to UNDP to do everything possible to encourage countries to shoulder the responsibility for national execution of projects, as called for in General Assembly resolution 44/211 and other decisions by the UNDP Governing Council 19/ (90/34, 90/21 and 91/27). Lastly, UNDP and the other bodies in the system have a mandate to finance development activities in the developing countries and the least developed countries (LDCs).

35. In the UNDP field offices, the Resident Representative plays an important role vis-à-vis the governmental authorities and national officials. He

supports the Government's efforts as regards the management of "IPF" funds and the execution of projects financed both by UNDP and by other lenders (specialized agencies and other donors, etc.). He helps the country's political leaders to shoulder their responsibilities in the execution of their projects. He also helps to arrange seminars and training workshops for national officials to strengthen the national capacities that Governments desire. Lastly, he provides information designed to facilitate the recruitment of experts, the use of funds and the maintenance of accounts, as well as mastery of the modalities of international procurement and the regulations governing them.

36. Clearly, then, the mandate of UNDP includes elements which enable it in principle to avoid the two-speed logic which is embryonic in NEX, as suggested previously. Yet in practice this power depends both on the specific situation in each country and on the rigour and efficiency with which UNDP staff, and particularly Resident Representatives in the developing countries, discharge their responsibilities. For the moment, it must be acknowledged that a marked imbalance persists in the ratio between NEX projects and total projects to the detriment of the regions that contain the largest numbers of LDCs (Africa) and the countries in transition in central and eastern Europe. 20/

The specialized agencies

37. The specialized agencies have a mandate to help member countries acquire the technical and managerial capacity to enable them to execute their programmes and projects themselves. Thus they should organize training courses, seminars and workshops, in member countries or outside, which would meet the totality of countries' needs for experts.

38. Under resolution 47/199, each specialized agency should, in its own field of activity, take measures to contribute to national capacity-building and training staff from recipient countries that so desire. They should also see to it that they assign technically competent staff to the requesting countries so as to respond rapidly and efficiently to requests for advice from the Governments concerned, but also so as to have contacts with the NGOs and national agencies operating in the field.

39. The consistency between the mandate entrusted to the specialized agencies and the objectives of national execution of programmes/projects is quite undeniable. However, in practice, because of the structural and financial difficulties facing the agencies, this consistency is in jeopardy in many cases, and with it the very effectiveness of their contribution to NEX.

40. Some specialized agencies are reluctant to become involved in operations for which they are not implementing agencies, sometimes because they wish to maintain the quality of their services, and also, no doubt, exclusive control over their technologies. When, in these circumstances, they participate in the execution of programmes and/or projects, they prefer to execute them using their own experts. But the most important and also the most relevant reasons are to be found elsewhere. At least two deserve mention.

41. First, it should be noted that, because the financial resources allocated for the acquisition, by project beneficiaries, of the technical support services (TSS-1 and 2) of the large agencies (ILO, UNESCO, FAO, UNIDO and

DTCD) must be supplemented using the agencies' regular budgets, they have difficulty in decentralizing their services to all countries both owing to a shortage of resources under their budgets and because of the decline in funds from UNDP.

42. Secondly, as the small agencies have no access to the TSS-1 and TSS-2 facilities, while at the same time they are hard hit by the financial crisis in the United Nations system, the problem as regards their representation in the field is even more acute than that facing the large agencies. Because they are often not represented in the country, their domains of activity are not included in the programmes of the countries concerned. This has a number of consequences for these agencies:

(a) Countries do not always succeed in identifying projects or project components which relate to their areas of competence and specialization;

(b) Their absence from the country when the country programme is drawn up favours the selection of sometimes inappropriate institutions to execute a project that falls within their terms of reference;

(c) Theoretically, they are represented in the country by the Resident Coordinator, who is supposed to advise the Government on any subject, including sometimes areas related to highly advanced technologies such as those dealt with by some of these small agencies. In order to perform such a function effectively, the resident coordinator should normally be a man (or a woman) of exceptional versatility and a wide range of comprehensive knowledge, which in human terms is not yet possible.

43. All things considered, it is by no means an exaggeration to state that effective and efficient participation by the specialized agencies in the three-sided partnership laid down in the concept of national execution of programmes and projects is not greatly in evidence. Additional steps which take into account the real difficulties faced by the agencies have yet to be taken in order to reduce the gap between the highly relevant concept of NEX and the policy to which it gives rise in practice.

## B. Interrelations

### Between Governments and UNDP

44. The relations pursued under the concept of national execution of programmes and/or projects between UNDP, Governments and specialized agencies are relations involving partnership, not assistance. This implies that each of the partners must discharge its responsibilities fully and responsibly, without exceeding or falling short on all or part of its mandate.

45. It is noteworthy that in some countries, owing to the alleged or real complexity of procedures and rules in both UNDP and other organizations in the United Nations system, the authorities prefer to forgo all responsibility and entrust to the UNDP representative the preparation and formulation of the programme and even sole responsibility for selecting the implementing agent for the projects. Hence the constant risk that a resident representative may usurp the role of the State. There have even been cases where resident representatives have substituted themselves for the State in its

responsibility for its programmes/projects, and for its representatives (ministers and chiefs of overseeing departments), and taken on the drafting of the country strategy note (CSN) in their place.

46. This note is normally prepared at the request of a Government, with the assistance of the organizations in the United Nations system and in cooperation with them, in order to lay down the priorities which must be supported using the resources of the United Nations system. The purpose of the CSN is to lay down a strategy accepted by all the partners, with a view to securing a consistent and coordinated response on the part of the United Nations system to the requirements of countries' plans, strategies and priorities. 21/

47. In other countries, UNDP has strengthened its offices, and they take on project implementation instead of officials of the country. The reason given is simply that the State has entrusted project management to the Resident Representative (or UNDP office) in order to prevent inappropriate use of project funds by its nationals as a result of their lack of experience.

48. Paragraph 1.4 (a) of PPM 30503 stipulates that: "When the executing agent for a UNDP-financed project is proposed to the Regional Bureau, the Resident Representative should ensure that the Government is designated as executing agent, even though the Resident Representative must ... ensure that the Government has the necessary competence to execute the project." Indeed, this raises a number of questions:

(a) The definition of the concept of national execution of projects, resolutions 44/211 and 47/199 and the various UNDP decisions and regulations lay down clearly that the Government is responsible for its programme and the execution of its projects;

(b) By virtue of the provisions of the UNDP "Guidelines", 22/ it is normally the Government that, with technical assistance from UNDP and in consultation with the specialized agencies, should assess its capacity with a view to the possible execution of its programme, and not the UNDP Resident Representative alone;

(c) On the basis of the provisions of article 1.4 (a) of the PPM already mentioned, we would be justified in asking whether the UNDP Resident Representative has, unaided, the multidisciplinary technical competence necessary to evaluate the capacity of the State and decide whether or not to designate it the executing agency.

49. Fortunately such cases are exceptions, but their very existence, combined with the ambiguity of article 14 (a) of the PPM, gives an idea of the risks involved in the application of NEX if steps are not taken to prevent both such an abdication of responsibility on the part of Governments and such encroachments by a number of resident representatives with somewhat over-enthusiastic personalities.

Between specialized agencies and UNDP

50. Details of execution and implementation are laid down at the time the programme or projects are designed, taking into account government policies,

factors specific to the country and the overall needs of each individual project. This process is carried out jointly by the Government, UNDP and the specialized agencies, so as to enable the Government to nominate executing and implementing agents for the programme or projects.

51. Cases have been encountered where specialized agencies had not been invited by the Government or even the Resident Representative of a country to execute one or more project elements until after it had been formulated, evaluated and approved. On other occasions a specialized agency will be approached when the agent in charge of implementation experiences technical difficulties, or when execution is delayed owing to the agent's incompetence. In such cases, some agencies have quite simply turned down such invitations; on the rare occasions when they have accepted, they have imposed strict conditions that preserve their credibility vis-à-vis the country and prevent them from getting involved in the execution of a poorly evaluated or under-evaluated project.

52. Thus it is important to emphasize that the harmonious and effective operation of NEX depends crucially on equitably involving all the specialized agencies ahead of the process of execution and implementation of country programmes and projects.

53. Taken together in their complexity, all these elements lead one to believe that, despite considerable efforts in conceptualizing the national execution of programmes and projects, and the generally positive and encouraging results already obtained, the proper and productive application of the concept of NEX still requires a number of links to be tightened, failing which the fundamental aim of NEX may never be fully attained.

54. Firstly, if the countries are to discharge properly the role assigned to them, it is vital that their decision makers and senior officials should have received adequate training in the programming and evaluation of their programmes as well as the management of the resources allocated for the execution of those programmes.

55. Along the same lines, it is important that they should make effective use of the staff trained in this way in order to avoid the indefinite repetition of this preliminary task, without which they will never gain control of the process, nor the unaided execution of their projects, nor, ultimately, their endogenous development. The option of delegating their responsibility to outside agencies should be regarded only as a supplementary option which is wholly temporary in nature and must absolutely be combined with training of national staff.

56. Secondly, the lack of effective coordination between the technical support services of the specialized agencies in the country tends in practice to replace the necessary mix of cooperation and development by the organizations of the United Nations system. This atmosphere of competition is harmful both to the development of the activities of the small agencies and to effective execution and implementation of programmes and projects.

57. Furthermore, inadequate coordination among all the partners in NEX at all stages, and particularly the stages which precede the process of national execution of projects, taken together with the shortage of financial resources

affecting certain agencies, leads to dysfunctional and counter-productive NEX. In that regard more rigorous coordination and relatively centralized management of all resources intended for operational technical cooperation activities could be envisaged as possible means of preventing the machinery for relations between NEX partners from seizing up.

Between specialized agencies and Governments

58. Informal inter-agency consultations were held in April 1994 among most of the United Nations organizations. These consultations offered the specialized agencies an opportunity to take stock of their activities within the framework of national execution of projects. At its most recent session, which has just ended, ECOSOC summed up the relations between the different participating agencies in documents E/1994/64, section II.D, and E/1994/64/Add.1, section IV.

59. The summaries in these reports do not emphasize any major difficulty in relations between specialized agencies and Governments. The only problem - not a small one - lies in the need to decentralize technical support services to ensure that countries receive the assistance they need in good time and in an appropriate manner.

60. UNFPA and ILO in particular have endeavoured to address this difficulty by setting up country support teams and multidisciplinary consultative teams respectively. In this regard the small agencies are particularly badly placed.

61. In the face of rapid technological change and short product cycles for new products, the developing countries experience considerable difficulty in promoting the competitiveness of their products. The specialized agencies in the United Nations system, particularly those like ITU and IAEA which operate in extremely advanced technical areas, should help them to acquire the new technologies at a cost which is competitive vis-à-vis market prices. This can only be achieved if there is an unhindered flow of information between the countries and agencies concerned.

## III. DYSFUNCTION IN NEX:

### Some examples

62. Field surveys and the various interviews on which this report is based have supplied a few illustrative examples of dysfunction in NEX, to which may be added other cases, not reported as such, that can be inferred from the wishes expressed by all the partners concerned.

### A. Programming

63. Programming is an important phase in the process of national execution of projects. It comprises identification of priority sectors, project formulation and project evaluation. Yet this is the stage at which one most often finds either inadequate or inappropriately targeted training or a lack of cooperation between some resident representatives and organizations in the United Nations system, particularly the regional economic commissions and small specialized agencies.

64. Thus FAO would like UNDP to finance a special training programme for national programming capacity at the level of decision makers and senior officials; for it is at this level that some Governments, on encountering difficulties in fulfilling their role as executing agents for programmes and projects, often leave responsibility for them to UNDP representatives. This desire bears all the greater a resemblance to a criticism since it emanates from FAO, which usually contributes to a training programme in programme formulation and evaluation for its staff, both at headquarters and in the field, and trains national directors, coordinators and other officials, holding seminars and information sessions at its headquarters and the Turin Centre on its own resources.

65. As regards the lack of cooperation between certain UNDP staff and organizations in the United Nations system, it is important to mention that the regional economic commissions have never in practice been involved in this phase, still less in the overall process of national execution of projects, even though General Assembly resolution 32/197 of 20 December 1977 provides that they should help developing countries, at the request of interested Governments, in identifying projects and preparing programmes for the promotion of cooperation among countries. According to the resolution, the regional economic commissions are the main economic and social development centres within the United Nations system for their respective regions.

66. They should, taking into account the specific requirements and conditions in the countries in their regions, take on the role of team leaders and assume responsibility for coordination and cooperation at the regional level. They should also participate fully in the application of policies and the taking of decisions on programmes drawn up by entities within the system.

67. Another significant case of such lack of cooperation involved ITU in China. Under a Chinese project for which it was selected as implementing agent by the Government at the insistence of the UNDP Resident Representative, without having participated in project evaluation, it ran into many difficulties, including:

(a) The linguistic communication problem between the ITU experts, on the one hand, and the National Project Director and the other national staff on the other;

(b) Certain slow responses to ITU requests;

(c) The undervaluation of the project: as the sums allocated were clearly inadequate, recruiting even national experts was very difficult because their salaries were extremely small compared to the cost of living in their country. It was all the more out of the question to recruit high-quality experts on the international market who would accept such conditions. 23/

68. Certainly it is such experiences that underlie the insistence of ITU and ILO on the need to ensure that all specialized agencies are represented when the country's framework programme is prepared and formulated.

B. Implementation

69. The principal dysfunction in NEX as regards implementation relates to selection of the implementing agent for projects. In the cases which have been reported or noted in the field, the choice was often made after insufficient coordination among the partners; in any event such choices were not always made in a context of the greatest transparency.

70. Thus, for example, FAO points out that in Latin America the selection of an implementing agent is made by the Resident Representative without consulting the agencies. Hence frequent use is made of the services offered by OPS and the UNDP regional bureaux.

71. Under the aegis of the Government of India, UNIDO is involved in the execution of the National Leather Development Programme, financed by UNDP (IPF) to a total of US$ 15 million, and including 11 projects. The Government has set up a "Programme Management Committee" including appointees from the Government, UNDP, foreign private industry, local and federal industry and research and training institutes; but none of the agencies of the United Nations system is on the Committee, even though they have at the same time been invited to provide advice in line with their experience. UNIDO, FAO, ILO and other agencies have been selected by the Committee to implement various projects, and the advisers from the agencies are invited to important Committee meetings, but it is unclear what criteria govern their selection.

72. In Asia, ILO has a presence in 10 countries out of 26, as an implementing agency for NEX projects. It has encouraged the use of national project directors, for whom it has organized courses on project management methods. It reports a highly instructive example of a large country in the region in which national execution has been particularly difficult:

(a) The supervising ministry designated a national project director without taking account of the criteria in the project document;

(b) In many cases, a lack of cooperation has been observed between the UNDP Resident Representative and the government representative (National Project Director);

(c) Similarly, little sign has been seen of good cooperation between the technical project head and the National Project Director, the latter being a member of the national administration assigned to a project implemented by ILO.

73. UNESCO has participated in a number of NEX projects, including:

in Mozambique:

MOZ/82/004 - ARPAC (Archives of Cultural Heritage) in 1983-1987;

MOZ/89/021 - Training Support for Social Cultural Research and Documentation in 1990-1993

in Swaziland:

SWA/82/002 - Assistance to the National Museum (1983-1987)

in Uganda:

UGA/87/001: Rehabilitation of the National Museum

in Ethiopia:

ETH/86/008: Conservation of the historic town of Harar (1987-1991)

in Morocco:

MOR/90/003 - Southern casbahs rehabilitation centre (1991-1994).

74. UNESCO points out that in all these projects, as far as the choice of implementing agencies is concerned, the terms of article 2.2, paragraph 5 [Procedures of the UNDP modalities of project execution (Government execution) item 30503], which provides that a copy of the proposal by the Resident Representative should be sent to all the competent agencies, were not respected by any UNDP Resident Representative in the countries in question. However, in the case of project MOZ/89/021 a draft project document was sent to UNESCO for its comments and views.

75. Moreover, no appropriate arrangements were made to enable UNESCO to supervise these projects properly and provide technical support. In the case of project ETH/86/008, UNDP seems to have decided unilaterally to entrust project execution to the Government, following a request for US$ 250,000 by UNESCO for the budget of this project. In the case of project UGA/87/001, UNESCO was only invited to the tripartite evaluation of the preceding project, UGA/84/022, at the Saana Meeting, in November 1994.

C. Project management

76. There have been few reports of dysfunction in this area, aside from project MOR/90/003, for which UNESCO had to intervene directly, appointing a woman architect to deal with the operation and technical management of the Centre, since the junior Moroccan architects recruited were sorely lacking in experience.

77. In fact, project management is one of the components of national execution of projects to which the specialized agencies have made the greatest contribution, in particular through training of national management personnel, as is clear from the reports submitted by the agencies to the informal inter-agency consultations held in April 1994. 24/

## IV. CONCLUSION

78. National execution of programmes and projects has incontestably become the norm for the execution of multilateral projects financed by organizations in the United Nations system. The number of projects executed in this way is growing, albeit with rather substantial differences between regions, but nevertheless growing steadily in all regions.

79. All the partners seem to have firmly adopted it, but noteworthy cases of dysfunction in its application still call for some adjustments, particularly as regards the roles and relationships of the various partners.

80. At the country level, there is a need to continue work both to explain the new procedures and rules of UNDP and the specialized agencies, and to train decision makers and senior staff, especially in programming and overall management, so as to enable governments to discharge their responsibilities as executing agents for their projects and thus steadily develop their national capacities.

81. Within UNDP, there is a need to promote regular and enhanced coordination between all the partners and their involvement at all levels of the process of national execution of projects, and to raise the degree of transparency in the choice of implementing agencies everywhere. It is also important that new financial arrangements for technical support services should be simplified, clarified and explained sufficiently clearly to prevent them from contributing in practice to reducing the use made of technical support from the specialized agencies, as is the case currently.

82. As regards the specialized agencies, they should make an effort to transfer constantly developing know-how and advanced technologies to the developing countries at affordable prices.

83. The lessons drawn from NEX are also valid for all development projects, whatever their sources of funding: bilateral funds and technical assistance financed by specialized agencies, the World Bank and multilateral sources such as UNDP, United Nations funds and others.

## Notes

1/ Customs clearances, tax approvals, over-rigid national legislation, etc.

2/ JIU/REP/78/3.

3/ Resolution 44/211, para. 18 (b).

4/ Resolution 47/199, para. 43.

5/ Resolution 47/199, para. 40.

6/ The successor arrangements introduced in 1992.

7/ See General Business Guide for Potential Suppliers of Goods and Services to the United Nations System, Copenhagen, UNDP and IAPSO, May 1992.

8/ See, in particular, para. 9 of decision 93/25 of the Governing Council of UNDP.

9/ FAO, ILO, UNIDO, UNESCO (the so-called large agencies) and IAEA, IMO, ITU, UPU, WFP (the so-called small agencies).

10/ This concept was devised by UNDP and, before being applied to the activities of all the specialized agencies in the United Nations system with slight variations depending on the agency concerned, its implementation began in the context of the execution of programmes and projects financed by UNDP. For this reason, the elements used to define the concept in this study are those deriving from the UNDP guidelines.

11/ "Guidelines on determination of execution and implementation arrangements and successor arrangements for agency support costs", New York, UNDP, 1992 (draft).

12/ UNDP's Programme and Projects Manual 30503, para. 1.3.

13/ FAO, DTCD, ILO, UNIDO and UNESCO.

14/ With the exception of the Office for Project Services and the World Bank group, which are governed by a modified new system.

15/ See ECOSOC document E/1994/64 of 25 May 1994 entitled "Operational activities of the United Nations for international development cooperation", p. 15.

16/ Inter-Agency Informal Consultations on Programme Approach and National Execution, Turin, 28-30 April 1994, ILO International Training Centre. See p. 8 of the report.

17/ Resolution 47/199, of 22 December 1992 - Government Cash Counterpart Contribution (GCCC).

18/ See PPM 30503 (e) 1: Assistance to Governments to enhance their execution capability.

19/ See UNDP Governing Council decisions 90/21, 91/27 and 90/34.

20/ See table 3 and figure 5 on page 17.

21/ See resolution 47/199, para. 9 (b), (c) and (d).

22/ Op. cit., p. 6, para. 2.2.1.

23/ For example, allocation for a 15-day contract in China, US$ 6,000; travel costs, US$ 4,000; balance remaining, US$ 2,000 (15 per cent per diem, 85 per cent salary), or US$ 1,700 for 15 days' salary.

24/ See ECOSOC documents E/1994/64, section II.D, and E/1994/64/Add.1, section IV.

Annexes I and II

Abbreviations for budget items

| | |
|---|---|
| PER | Personnel |
| SUB | Subcontracting |
| TRN | Training |
| EQP | Equipment |
| MSC | Miscellaneous |
| SUP | Support costs |
| 099 | Grand total |
| CSH | Cost-sharing |
| 999 | NET TOTAL |

/...

Annex I

PROGRAMME INFORMATION PROFILE - FUNCTION 2

ANNUAL BUDGET SUMMARY - BUDGETS BY REGION

AFRICA

| | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | TOTAL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PER | 168 285 677 | 195 832 164 | 230 604 680 | 258 064 935 | 223 033 706 | 208 733 167 | 1 284 554 329 |
| SUB | 31 453 663 | 34 084 479 | 40 943 334 | 39 335 447 | 33 599 541 | 40 231 186 | 219 647 650 |
| TRN | 35 671 827 | 42 729 742 | 48 978 731 | 52 950 701 | 42 287 441 | 53 569 914 | 276 188 356 |
| EQP | 75 123 579 | 64 937 953 | 66 653 144 | 55 490 044 | 42 396 533 | 49 901 651 | 354 502 904 |
| MSC | 26 103 163 | 27 704 573 | 31 114 042 | 36 187 103 | 31 816 883 | 29 476 167 | 182 401 931 |
| SUP | 2 147 457 | 1 574 230 | 1 265 128 | 923 087 | 869 577 | 426 497 | 7 205 976 |
| 099 | 338 785 366 | 366 863 141 | 419 559 059 | 442 951 317 | 374 003 681 | 382 338 582 | 2 324 501 146 |
| CSH | -19 430 321 | -15 265 825 | -18 945 778 | -22 858 309 | -32 343 946 | -38 507 328 | -147 351 507 |
| 999 | 319 355 045 | 351 597 316 | 400 613 281 | 420 093 008 | 341 659 735 | 343 831 254 | 177 149 639 |
| NUMBER OF PROJECTS: 4 219 | | | | | | | |

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

| | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | TOTAL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PER | 96 125 531 | 105 141 473 | 121 034 157 | 137 307 432 | 126 114 963 | 154 228 767 | 739 952 323 |
| SUB | 48 424 346 | 54 896 948 | 66 577 352 | 65 919 579 | 61 026 521 | 77 031 337 | 373 876 083 |
| TRN | 50 591 861 | 54 818 046 | 60 347 377 | 57 053 294 | 47 584 902 | 66 621 155 | 337 016 635 |
| EQP | 75 964 898 | 65 695 968 | 87 204 059 | 76 999 845 | 57 376 498 | 85 591 421 | 448 832 689 |
| MSC | 8 347 738 | 8 665 910 | 10 730 341 | 10 231 210 | 10 320 473 | 13 043 862 | 61 339 534 |
| SUP | 372 542 | 646 083 | 725 648 | 316 807 | 284 916 | 58 175 | 2 404 171 |
| 099 | 279 826 916 | 289 864 428 | 346 618 934 | 347 828 167 | 302 708 273 | 396 574 717 | 1 963 421 435 |
| CSH | -20 250 898 | -19 537 623 | -22 814 199 | -26 302 452 | -26 222 117 | -41 633 273 | -156 760 562 |
| 999 | 259 576 018 | 270 326 805 | 323 804 735 | 321 525 715 | 276 486 156 | 354 941 444 | 1 806 660 873 |
| NUMBER OF PROJECTS: 3 846 | | | | | | | |

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| ARAB STATES | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | TOTAL |
| PER | 36 171 279 | 44 162 613 | 50 893 071 | 46 772 244 | 43 241 697 | 51 894 739 | 273 135 643 |
| SUB | 6 163 305 | 9 843 639 | 15 998 025 | 14 288 457 | 15 737 573 | 19 825 847 | 81 856 846 |
| TRN | 7 549 277 | 10 120 788 | 12 685 653 | 9 111 241 | 8 064 346 | 11 783 322 | 59 314 627 |
| EQP | 20 541 452 | 20 961 764 | 21 684 170 | 18 073 369 | 16 922 206 | 15 413 286 | 113 596 247 |
| MSC | 2 304 240 | 4 093 684 | 3 996 371 | 5 308 170 | 4 671 704 | 6 467 751 | 26 841 920 |
| SUP | 259 893 | 322 609 | 424 493 | 174 548 | 106 702 | 23 260 | 1 311 505 |
| 099 | 72 989 446 | 89 505 097 | 105 681 783 | 93 728 029 | 88 744 228 | 105 408 205 | 556 056 788 |
| CSH | -16 293 549 | -16 334 632 | -21 833 921 | -29 628 455 | -23 002 372 | -36 927 675 | -144 020 604 |
| 999 | 56 695 897 | 73 170 465 | 83 847 862 | 64 099 574 | 65 741 856 | 68 480 530 | 412 036 184 |
| NUMBER OF PROJECTS: 1 392 | | | | | | | |

| EUROPE | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | TOTAL |
| PER | 3 920 752 | 3 911 946 | 3 727 206 | 6 754 975 | 4 656 018 | 6 010 339 | 28 981 236 |
| SUB | 731 029 | 1 372 552 | 1 179 823 | 2 164 151 | 513 675 | 1 697 595 | 7 658 825 |
| TRN | 3 568 714 | 3 788 657 | 4 755 442 | 4 706 630 | 2 179 206 | 2 587 969 | 21 586 618 |
| EQP | 5 462 461 | 7 029 908 | 4 536 798 | 4 720 807 | 2 284 303 | 4 758 068 | 28 792 345 |
| MSC | 364 964 | 338 460 | 462 588 | 521 097 | 332 308 | 480 474 | 2 499 891 |
| SUP | 8 486 | -530 | 8 789 | 11 190 | 0 | 0 | 27 935 |
| 099 | 14 056 406 | 16 440 993 | 14 670 646 | 18 878 850 | 9 965 510 | 15 534 445 | 89 546 850 |
| CSH | -563 831 | -1 296 612 | -1 758 693 | -2 865 985 | -925 048 | -5 169 012 | -12 579 181 |
| 999 | 13 492 575 | 15 144 381 | 12 911 953 | 16 012 865 | 9 040 462 | 10 365 433 | 76 967 669 |
| NUMBER OF PROJECTS: 586 | | | | | | | |



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| LATIN AMERICA | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | TOTAL |
| PER | 70 682 459 | 76 084 928 | 84 903 399 | 103 118 411 | 129 504 548 | 211 153 031 | 675 446 776 |
| SUB | 11 458 701 | 13 459 952 | 14 705 364 | 23 827 537 | 46 290 903 | 137 797 250 | 247 539 707 |
| TRN | 11 534 747 | 11 006 848 | 11 753 488 | 12 502 389 | 13 746 810 | 38 345 201 | 98 889 483 |
| EQP | 33 579 179 | 29 973 933 | 29 934 442 | 39 375 008 | 48 238 985 | 92 895 527 | 273 997 074 |
| MSC | 6 377 963 | 6 556 056 | 7 544 720 | 15 527 416 | 14 445 785 | 24 685 117 | 75 137 057 |
| SUP | 181 361 | 144 457 | 47 427 | 1 683 | 0 | 0 | 374 928 |
| 099 | 133 814 410 | 137 226 174 | 148 888 840 | 194 352 444 | 252 227 031 | 504 876 126 | 1 371 385 025 |
| CSH | -47 518 236 | -56 756 142 | -68 543 668 | 114 069 004 | -175 870 396 | -446 036 229 | -908 793 675 |
| 999 | 86 296 174 | 80 470 032 | 80 345 172 | 80 283 440 | 76 356 635 | 58 839 897 | 462 591 350 |
| NUMBER OF PROJECTS: 3 022 | | | | | | | |

| INTERREGIONAL AND GLOBAL PROJECTS - GRAND TOTAL | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | TOTAL |
| PER | 19 113 044 | 24 923 533 | 31 114 994 | 33 854 696 | 27 260 812 | 30 966 014 | 167 233 093 |
| SUB | 23 243 040 | 22 236 745 | 35 342 794 | 42 095 466 | 34 272 521 | 41 675 684 | 198 866 250 |
| TRN | 3 621 274 | 5 093 219 | 4 880 330 | 2 995 777 | 5 107 280 | 5 200 362 | 26 898 242 |
| EQP | 2 452 040 | 3 077 125 | 4 053 363 | 6 165 641 | 3 988 750 | 3 751 210 | 23 488 129 |
| MSC | 1 849 909 | 1 540 085 | 2 386 272 | 2 466 278 | 1 981 271 | 1 969 058 | 12 192 873 |
| SUP | 662 084 | 824 053 | 1 122 682 | 657 133 | 460 419 | 483 504 | 4 209 875 |
| 099 | 50 941 391 | 57 694 760 | 78 900 435 | 88 234 991 | 73 071 053 | 84 045 832 | 432 888 462 |
| CSH | -10 847 313 | -8 748 912 | -6 258 317 | -17 753 606 | -13 232 557 | -17 643 240 | -74 483 945 |
| 999 | 40 094 078 | 48 945 848 | 72 642 118 | 70 481 385 | 59 838 496 | 66 402 592 | 358 404 517 |
| NUMBER OF PROJECTS: 3 712 | | | | | | | |



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| GRAND TOTAL | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | TOTAL |
| PER | 394 298 742 | 450 056 657 | 522 277 507 | 585 872 693 | 553 811 744 | 662 986 057 | 3 169 303 400 |
| SUB | 121 474 084 | 135 894 315 | 174 746 692 | 187 630 637 | 191 440 734 | 318 258 899 | 1 129 445 361 |
| TRN | 112 537 700 | 127 557 300 | 143 401 021 | 139 320 032 | 118 969 985 | 178 107 923 | 819 893 961 |
| EQP | 213 123 609 | 191 676 651 | 214 065 976 | 200 824 714 | 171 207 275 | 252 311 163 | 1 243 209 388 |
| MSC | 45 347 977 | 48 898 768 | 56 234 334 | 70 241 274 | 63 568 424 | 76 122 429 | 360 413 206 |
| SUP | 3 631 823 | 3 510 902 | 3 594 167 | 2 084 448 | 1 721 614 | 991 436 | 15 534 390 |
| 099 | 890 413 935 | 957 594 593 | 1 114 319 697 | 1 185 973 798 | 1 100 719 776 | 1 488 777 907 | 6 737 799 706 |
| CSH | -114 904 148 | -117 939 746 | -140 154 576 | -213 477 811 | -271 596 436 | -585 916 757 | 1 443 989 474 |
| 999 | 775 509 787 | 839 654 847 | 974 165 121 | 972 495 987 | 829 123 340 | 902 861 150 | 5 293 810 232 |
| NUMBER OF PROJECTS: 13 755 | | | | | | | |



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Annex II

PROGRAMME INFORMATION PROFILE - FUNCTION 2

ANNUAL BUDGET SUMMARY - FOR GOVERNMENT BY REGION

GVT AFRICA

| | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | TOTAL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PER | 8 287 282 | 8 944 200 | 12 588 188 | 14 931 205 | 20 428 241 | 38 334 876 | 103 513 992 |
| SUB | 4 516 178 | 2 599 161 | 2 971 814 | 5 474 754 | 8 312 403 | 15 850 712 | 39 725 022 |
| TRN | 4 938 063 | 4 531 486 | 5 682 508 | 6 376 410 | 7 765 498 | 12 644 851 | 41 938 816 |
| EQP | 8 676 347 | 6 299 183 | 9 332 882 | 6 860 227 | 7 579 691 | 15 286 209 | 54 034 539 |
| MSC | 2 780 840 | 3 924 063 | 3 714 951 | 4 368 751 | 4 748 779 | 4 477 871 | 24 015 255 |
| SUP | 49 984 | 121 445 | 224 796 | 313 558 | 297 640 | 139 100 | 1 146 523 |
| 199 | 29 248 694 | 26 419 538 | 34 515 139 | 38 324 905 | 49 132 252 | 86 733 619 | 264 374 147 |
| CSH | -2 160 099 | -1 745 404 | -2 368 228 | -939 423 | -2 657 830 | -8 433 262 | -18 304 246 |
| 999 | 27 088 595 | 24 674 134 | 32 146 911 | 37 385 482 | 46 474 422 | 78 300 357 | 246 069 901 |

NUMBER OF PROJECTS: 613

GVT ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

| | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | TOTAL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PER | 7 178 773 | 8 470 632 | 8 565 025 | 10 225 483 | 15 460 935 | 38 314 549 | 88 215 397 |
| SUB | 4 524 875 | 8 248 024 | 7 918 410 | 7 012 864 | 14 631 905 | 23 974 027 | 66 310 105 |
| TRN | 6 492 705 | 8 035 608 | 10 078 721 | 9 664 209 | 11 288 797 | 28 111 883 | 73 671 923 |
| EQP | 10 205 136 | 11 567 230 | 14 211 421 | 18 654 653 | 14 577 316 | 48 839 778 | 118 055 534 |
| MSC | 534 734 | 969 696 | 771 357 | 921 134 | 1 357 940 | 3 841 752 | 8 396 613 |
| SUP | 54 798 | 101 933 | 2 075 | 4 525 | 2 000 | 0 | 165 331 |
| 099 | 28 991 021 | 37 393 123 | 41 547 009 | 46 482 868 | 57 318 893 | 143 081 989 | 354 814 903 |
| CSH | -2 971 620 | -4 621 824 | -10 569 542 | -13 050 748 | -9 356 609 | -19 886 137 | -60 456 480 |
| 999 | 26 019 401 | 32 771 299 | 30 977 467 | 33 432 120 | 47 962 284 | 123 195 852 | 294 358 423 |

NUMBER OF PROJECTS: 767

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| GVT ARAB STATES | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | TOTAL |
| PER | 974 368 | 1 051 395 | 1 886 570 | 3 956 478 | 6 741 208 | 13 127 447 | 27 737 466 |
| SUB | 511 817 | 1 390 076 | 1 921 741 | 3 262 113 | 4 675 464 | 6 282 313 | 18 043 524 |
| TRN | 674 255 | 1 036 777 | 1 177 058 | 1 102 863 | 1 618 702 | 3 122 696 | 8 732 351 |
| EQP | 1 360 582 | 1 959 401 | 2 151 628 | 3 502 511 | 7 367 065 | 6 580 998 | 22 922 185 |
| MSC | 173 363 | 158 745 | 323 811 | 939 164 | 1 233 429 | 2 923 176 | 5 751 688 |
| SUP | 1 239 | 68 580 | 9 905 | 12 746 | 57 519 | 8 920 | 158 909 |
| 099 | 3 695 624 | 5 664 974 | 7 470 713 | 12 775 875 | 21 693 387 | 32 045 550 | 83 346 123 |
| CSH | -448 258 | -1 109 909 | -1 103 883 | -1 522 602 | -2 149 892 | -7 905 723 | -14 240 267 |
| 999 | 3 247 366 | 4 555 065 | 6 366 830 | 11 253 273 | 19 543 495 | 24 139 827 | 69 105 856 |
| NUMBER OF PROJECTS: 183 | | | | | | | |

| GVT EUROPE | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | TOTAL |
| PER | 35 580 | 123 293 | 119 710 | 1 845 165 | 724 497 | 1 281 059 | 4 129 304 |
| SUB | 47 636 | 94 500 | 28 763 | 214 463 | 149 528 | 645 024 | 1 179 914 |
| TRN | 150 604 | 157 441 | 247 709 | 607 331 | 162 184 | 601 970 | 1 927 239 |
| EQP | 391 503 | 465 835 | 727 525 | 1 218 197 | 509 471 | 1 654 844 | 4 967 375 |
| MSC | 14 660 | 6 352 | 19 322 | 52 724 | 22 068 | 131 995 | 247 121 |
| SUP | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 099 | 639 983 | 847 421 | 1 143 029 | 3 937 880 | 1 567 748 | 4 314 892 | 12 450 953 |
| CSH | 0 | -140 290 | -178 898 | -1 111 010 | -143 296 | -1 582 058 | -3 155 552 |
| 999 | 639 983 | 707 131 | 964 131 | 2 826 870 | 1 424 452 | 2 732 834 | 9 295 401 |
| NUMBER OF PROJECTS: 77 | | | | | | | |

| GVT LATIN AMERICA | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | TOTAL |
| PER | 22 167 576 | 24 845 667 | 30 261 600 | 47 205 032 | 76 141 436 | 157 794 184 | 358 415 495 |
| SUB | 4 722 112 | 6 828 563 | 7 636 740 | 9 677 288 | 26 096 888 | 113 892 273 | 168 853 864 |
| TRN | 4 209 381 | 3 771 280 | 4 876 608 | 4 938 230 | 7 561 304 | 30 157 189 | 55 513 992 |
| EQP | 12 623 172 | 11 199 520 | 13 914 007 | 17 993 716 | 29 370 934 | 77 358 582 | 162 459 931 |
| MSC | 2 529 124 | 1 943 568 | 2 935 641 | 6 204 117 | 7 058 226 | 20 074 381 | 40 745 057 |
| SUP | 2 991 | 68 984 | 161 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 72 136 |
| 099 | 46 254 356 | 48 657 582 | 59 624 757 | 86 018 383 | 146 228 788 | 399 276 609 | 786 060 475 |
| CSH | -22 738 041 | -26 753 689 | -33 805 440 | -57 272 354 | -106 639 186 | -363 545 054 | -610 753 764 |
| 999 | 23 516 315 | 21 903 893 | 25 819 317 | 28 746 029 | 39 589 602 | 35 731 555 | 175 306 711 |
| NUMBER OF PROJECTS: 1 298 | | | | | | | |

| GVT INTERREGIONAL AND GLOBAL PROJECTS | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | TOTAL |
| PER | 109 416 | 215 599 | 160 512 | 199 217 | 119 800 | 0 | 804 544 |
| SUB | 51 185 | 0 | 0 | 30 600 | 20 400 | 0 | 102 185 |
| TRN | 0 | 0 | 34 000 | 26 000 | 0 | 0 | 60 000 |
| EQP | 80 720 | 116 950 | 10 000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 207 670 |
| MSC | 7 596 | 10 500 | 11 500 | 11 200 | 5 000 | 0 | 45 796 |
| SUP | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 099 | 248 917 | 343 049 | 216 012 | 267 017 | 145 200 | 0 | 1 220 195 |
| CSH | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 999 | 248 917 | 343 049 | 216 012 | 267 017 | 145 200 | 0 | 1 220 195 |

| GVT GRAND TOTAL | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | TOTAL |
| PER | 38 752 995 | 43 650 786 | 53 581 605 | 78 362 580 | 119 616 117 | 248 852 115 | 582 816 198 |
| SUB | 14 373 803 | 19 160 324 | 20 477 468 | 25 672 082 | 53 886 588 | 160 644 349 | 294 214 614 |
| TRN | 16 465 008 | 17 532 592 | 22 096 604 | 22 715 043 | 28 396 485 | 74 638 589 | 181 844 321 |
| EQP | 33 337 460 | 31 608 119 | 40 347 463 | 48 229 304 | 59 404 477 | 149 720 411 | 362 647 234 |
| MSC | 6 040 317 | 7 012 924 | 7 776 582 | 12 497 090 | 14 425 442 | 31 449 175 | 79 201 530 |
| SUP | 109 012 | 360 942 | 236 937 | 330 829 | 357 159 | 148 020 | 1 542 899 |
| 099 | 109 078 595 | 119 325 687 | 144 516 659 | 187 806 928 | 276 086 268 | 665 452 659 | 1 502 266 796 |
| CSH | -28 318 018 | -34 371 116 | -48 025 991 | -73 896 137 | -120 946 813 | -401 352 234 | -706 910 309 |
| 999 | 80 760 577 | 84 954 571 | 96 490 668 | 113 910 791 | 155 139 455 | 264 100 425 | 795 356 487 |
| NUMBER OF PROJECTS: 2 950 | | | | | | | |